2022 MONOGRAPH

2023 Why it's OK to be a Sports Fan (with Jake Wojtowicz) Routledge. 
This book offers readers a pitch side seat to the ethics of fandom. Its accessible six chapters are aimed both at true sports fans whose conscience may be occasionally piqued by their pastime, and at those who are more certain of the moral hazards involved in following a team or sport. ​Why It’s OK to Be a Sports Fan wrestles with a range of arguments against fandom and counters with its own arguments on why being a fan is very often a good thing. It looks at the ethical issues fans face, from the violent or racist behavior of those in the stands, to players’ infamous misdeeds, to owners debasing their own clubs. In response to these moral risks, the book argues that by being critical fans, followers of a team or individual can reap the benefits of fandom while avoiding many of the ethical pitfalls. The authors show the value in deeply loving a team, but also how a condition of this value is recognizing that the love of a fan comes with real limits and responsibilities.

2021 Honouring and Admiring the Immoral: An Ethical Guide (with Benjamin Matheson) Routledge. (Open Access) 
Is it appropriate to honour and admire people who have created great works of art, made important intellectual contributions, performed great sporting feats, or shaped the history of a nation if those people have also acted immorally? This book provides a philosophical investigation of this important and timely question. The authors draw on the latest research from ethics, value theory, philosophy of emotion, social philosophy, and social psychology to develop and substantiate arguments that have been made in the public debates about this issue. They offer a detailed analysis of the nature and ethics of honour and admiration, and present reasons both in favour and against honouring and admiring the immoral. They also take on the important matter of whether we can separate the achievements of public figures from their immoral behaviour. Ultimately, the authors reject a “onesize-fits-all” approach and argue that we must weigh up the reasons for and against honouring and admiring in each particular case. Honouring and Admiring the Immoral is written in an accessible style that shows how philosophy can engage with public debates about important ethical issues. It will be of interest to scholars and students working in moral philosophy, philosophy of emotion, and social philosophy.

EDITED COLLECTIONS  

2022 Honour and Admiration After War and Conflict. Special section of The Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol.39 (5) 
This special section explores philosophical issues, especially those related to ethics and social philosophy, concerning the forms of honour and admiration that take place in the wake of war and conflict. 

2022 The Morality of Fame. Special Issue of Ethical Perspectives Vol. 29 (1). 
This special issue examines a range of ethical issues related to fame and celebrity. 

2021 The Ethics of Love. Special Issue of The Journal of Ethics Vol.25 (4). 
This special issue examines a range of ethical issues related to love and loving relationships. 

2019 The Moral Psychology of Admiration (Edited with André Grahle) Rowman and Littlefield. 
By bringing the work of philosophers and psychologists together this volume is an interdisciplinary, though predominantly philosophical, exploration of an often discussed but rarely researched emotion; admiration. By exploring the moral psychology of admiration the volume examines the nature of this emotion, how it relates to other emotions such as wonder, envy and pride and what role admiration plays in our moral lives. As to the latter, a strong focus is on the potential link between admiration, emulation and the improvement of our characters, as well as of society as a whole.

2019 Emotions in Sport and Games (Edited with Nathan Wildman) Special Issue of Journal of Philosophy of Sport Vol.46 No.2
2021 Reprinted as Emotions in Sport and Games (London: Routledge). 
This special issue features papers from philosophers of sport and philosopher examining the role of emotions in sport and games. 
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2018 Sacrifice and Moral Philosophy Special Issue of International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol.26 No.3 
2020 Reprinted as Sacrifice and Moral Philosophy (London: Routledge). 
The aim of this special issue is to foster a more explicit and direct discussion of the concept of sacrifice and its importance in moral philosophy. The papers in this volume make an important contribution to our understanding of sacrifice in three areas. The first group of papers investigates the nature of sacrifice. The next group of papers investigates the role of sacrifice in moral philosophy. Three of these papers investigate the role of sacrifice in our moral lives generally, while two investigate the role of sacrifice in relation to particular moral theories. The final two papers investigate the value of sacrifice in relation to political and theological issues.


RESEARCH ARTICLES

Forth. Tightlacing and Abusive Normative Address. (With Alexander Edlich) Ergo. Penultimate Version available here. 
Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a distinctive kind of psychological abuse we call Tightlacing. We begin by presenting four examples and argue that there is a distinctive form of abuse in these examples that cannot be captured by our existing moral categories. We then outline our diagnosis of this distinctive form of abuse. Tightlacing consists in inducing a mistaken self-conception in others that licenses overburdening demands on them such that victims apply those demands to themselves. We discuss typical Tightlacing strategies and argue that Tightlacing typically is manipulative. Typical tightlacers will be motivated by a strong desire to suppress a kind of behaviour on the victim’s part. We will then differentiate Tightlacing from a related and widely discussed form of psychological abuse, Gaslighting. While Gaslighting focuses on the victim’s epistemic capacities and typically serves to insulate the abuser from potential dissent, Tightlacing focuses on the kind of person the victim is and typically serves to insulate the abuser from confronting ways of behaviour they cannot cope with. While Gaslighting targets the victim’s epistemic self-trust, Tightlacing targets their basic sense of who they are and their sense of entitlement to conduct themselves as who they really are. We finish by diagnosing the wrong-making features of Tightlacing, arguing that Tightlacing, among many secondary wrongs, makes the victim complicit in a denial of their rights as well as an erasure of who they are.

Forth. Using Stars for Moral Navigation (With Maureen Sie)  Journal of Applied Philosophy (Open Access) 
Abstract: What role do celebrities play in our moral lives? Philosophers have explored the potential for celebrities to function as moral exemplars and role models. We argue that there are more ways in which celebrities play a role in helping us navigate our moral lives. First, gossiping about celebrities helps us negotiate our moral norms and identify competing styles of life. Second, fandom for celebrities serves as the basis for the development of distinct moral communities and identities. Third, celebrities possess high levels of epistemic power which can be used to help change and adapt our moral norms. We will then investigate two kinds of problems that arise from using celebrities in this way. Firstly, harm is done to celebrities because they are used in the ways explained in the first part of the article; secondly, celebrity life has a distinctive nature that can affect the moral agency of celebrities. Fame, we suggest, might lead to a morally unhealthy asymmetry in human relationships. We end by discussing the ethical implications of our analysis and conclude that when using stars for moral navigation, we should take into account the harm this does to them and the distinctive nature of their lives.

Forth. Being a Celebrity: Alienation, Integrity, and the Uncanny. (With Catherine Robb) Journal of the American Philosophical Association  
Abstract: A central feature of being a celebrity is experiencing a divide between one's public image and private life. By appealing to the phenomenology of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, we analyze this experience as paradoxically involving both a disconnection and alienation from one's public persona and a sense of close connection with it. This ‘uncanny’ experience presents a psychological conflict for celebrities: they may have a public persona they feel alienated from and that is at the same time closely connected to them and shapes many of their personal interactions. We offer three ways in which a celebrity might approach this conflict: (i) eradicating the divide between their public and private selves, (ii) splitting or separating their private and public selves, or (iii) embracing the arising tension. We argue that it is only this third approach that successfully mitigates the negative effects of the alienation felt by many celebrities.

2023. Sportswashing: Complicity and Corruption (With Kyle Fruh and Jake Wojtowicz) Sport, Ethics and Philosophy Vol.17 (1) pp.101-118. (Open Access) 
Abstract: When the 2022 FIFA Men’s World Cup was awarded to Qatar, it raised a number of moral concerns, perhaps the most prominent of which was Qatar’s woeful record on human rights in the arena of migrant labour. Qatar’s interest in hosting the event is aptly characterised as a case of ‘sportswashing’. The first aim of this paper is to provide an account of the nature of sportswashing, as a practice of using an association with sport, usually through hosting an event or owning a club (such as Newcastle United, owned by Saudi Arabia), to subvert the way that others attend to a moral violation for which the sportswashing agent is responsible. This may be done through distracting away from wrongdoing, minimising it, or normalising it. Second, we offer an account of the distinctive wrongs of sportswashing. The gravest moral wrong is the background injustice which sportswashing threatens to perpetuate. But the distinctive wrongs of sportswashing are twofold: first, it makes participants in sport (athletes, coaches, journalists, fans) complicit in the sportswasher’s wrongdoing, which extends a moral challenge to millions of people involved with sport. Second, sportswashing corrupts valuable heritage associated with sporting traditions and institutions. Finally, we examine how sportswashing ought to be resisted. The appropriate forms of resistance will depend upon different roles people fill, such as athlete, coach, journalist, fan. The basic dichotomy of resistance strategies is to either exit the condition of complicity, for example by refusing to participate in the sporting event, or to modify one’s engagement with the goal of transformation in mind. We recognize this is difficult and potentially burdensome: sports are an important part of many of our lives; our approach attempts to respect this.

2022 Commemoration and Emotional Imperialism (With Benjamin Matheson) Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol.39 (5) pp.761-777. (Open Access) 
Abstract: The Northern Irish footballer James McClean chooses not to take part in the practice of wearing a plastic red poppy to commemorate those who have died fighting for the British Armed Forces. Each year he faces abuse, including occasional death threats, for his choice. This forms part of a wider trend towards ‘poppy enforcement’, the pressuring of people, particularly public figures, to wear the poppy. This enforcement seems wrong in part because, at least in some cases, it involves abuse. But is there anything else wrong with it? We will consider the various ways the existing literature on the ethics of commemoration might help us understand what is wrong with poppy enforcement. We will argue that this cannot provide a complete account of what is wrong with poppy enforcement. We then argue that such pressure can constitute two distinct forms of affective injustice, which are wrongs done to people specifically in their capacity as affective beings. In McClean’s case, we argue first that poppy enforcement is a violation of affective rights and second that he faces a particular type of affective injustice that we call emotional imperialism.

2022 Celebrity Politics and Democratic Elitism (Co-authored with Amanda Cawston) Topoi Vo.41 No.1 pp.33-43 (Open Access) 
Is there good reason to worry about celebrity involvement in democratic politics? The rise of celebrity politicians such as Donald Trump and Vladimir Zelensky has led political theorists and commentators to worry that the role of expertise in democratic politics has been undermined. According to one recent critique (Archer et al. 2020), celebrities possess a significant degree of epistemic power (the power to influence what people believe) that is unconnected to appropriate expertise. This presents a problem both for deliberative and epistemic theories of democratic legitimacy, which ignore this form of power, and for real existing democracies attempting to meet the standards of legitimacy set out by these theories. But do these critiques apply to democratic elitism? In this paper, we argue that recognition of celebrity epistemic power in fact represents a valuable resource for supporting the legitimacy and practice of democratic elitism, though these benefits do come with certain risks to which elite theories are particularly vulnerable.

2022 Talent, Skill, and Celebrity (Co-authored with Catherine Robb) Ethical Perspectives Vol.29 (1) pp.33-63. Penultimate Version Available here. 
A commonly raised criticism against celebrity culture is that it celebrates people who become famous without any connection to their skills, talents or achievements. A culture in which people become famous simply for being famous is criticized for being shallow and inauthentic. In this paper we offer a defence of celebrity by arguing against this criticism. We begin by outlining what we call the Talent Argument: celebrity is a negative cultural phenomenon because it creates and sustains fame without any connection to the accomplishments that arise from an expression of talent or skill. By appealing to the metaphysics of talent and skill, we argue against the Talent Argument and propose that being a celebrity requires the skills that are necessary to acquire and maintain one’s status as a celebrity. A celebrity is more likely to be talented and successful in their expression of these skills, and even celebrities who are ‘famous for being famous’ will often display talents and skills that give rise to their fame. This means that those who critique celebrity culture should not do so by appealing to the Talent Argument. We show how our account of celebrity, talent and skill works to reject both the strong version of the Talent Argument, as well as a weaker and more plausible version of the argument we call the Valuable Talents argument. We conclude by noting that our analysis has demonstrated the need to explore more closely the kinds of skills that are necessary to cultivate celebrity status. This allows for a more nuanced understanding of what a celebrity is, and the values that are attached to celebrity culture.

2022 It’s Much More Important Than That: Against Fictionalist Accounts of Fandom (Co-authored with Jake Wojtowicz) Journal of Philosophy of Sport Vol.49 No.1 pp.83-98. (Open Access)
Do sports fans really care about their team winning? According to several philosophers, the answer is no. Sports fans engage in fictional caring during the match, which involves a game of make-believe that the result is important. We will argue that this account does not provide a full account of the way in which fans relate to the teams they support. For many fans, the team they support forms a core part of their identity. The success or failure of their team impacts the community they are a part of and around which they build a central part of their identity. For these fans, it really does matter whether their team wins or loses. We will finish by articulating a more limited role that fictional caring may play in sports fandom.

2022 Online Affective Manipulation (With Nathan Wildman and Natascha Rietdijk) In F. Jongepier and M. Klenk (Eds.) Manipulation Online: Philosophical Perspectives on Human-Machine Interactions London: Routledge. (Open Access). 
The aim of this chapter is broadly exploratory: we want to better understand online affective manipulation and what, if anything, is morally problematic about it. To do so, we begin by pulling apart various forms of online affective manipulation. We then proceed to discuss why online affective manipulation is properly categorized as manipulative, as well as what is wrong with (online) manipulation more generally. Building on this, we next argue that, at its most extreme, online affective manipulation constitutes a novel form of affective injustice that we call affective powerlessness. To demonstrate this, we introduce the notions of affective injustice and affective powerlessness and show how several forms of online affective manipulation leave users in this state. The upshot is that this chapter gives us a better grip on the nature of online affective manipulation, as well some tools to help us understand when and why it is morally problematic.

2022. The Politics of Envy: Outlaw Emotions in Capitalist Societies (With Alan Thomas and Bart Engelen) in S. Protasi (Ed.) The Moral Psychology of Envy Lanham MA: Rowman & Littlefield. Penultimate version available here. 

2021. Fans, Crimes, and Misdemeanors: Fandom and the ethics of love Journal of Ethics Vol.25 No.4 pp.543-566
(Open Access) 
Abstract: Is it permissible to be a fan of an artist or a sports team that has behaved immorally? While this issue has recently been the subject of widespread public debate, it has received little attention in the philosophical literature. This paper will investigate this issue by examining the nature and ethics of fandom. I will argue that the crimes and misdemeanors of the object of fandom provide three kinds of moral reasons for fans to abandon their fandom. First, being a fan of the immoral may provide support for their immoral behavior. Second, fandom alters our perception in ways that will often lead us to be fail to perceive our idol’s faults and even to adopting immoral points of view in order to be able to maintain the positive view we have of them. Third, fandom, like friendship, may lead us to engage in acts of loyalty to protect the interests of our idols. This gives fans of the immoral good reason to abandon their fandom. However, these reasons will not always be conclusive and, in some cases, it may be possible to instead adopt a critical form of fandom.

2021. Post-Truth, False Balance and Virtuous Gatekeeping (With Natascha Rietdijk) In Nancy Snow and Maria Silvia Vaccarezza (eds.) Virtues, Democracy, and Online Media: Ethical and Epistemic Issues (London: Routledge) Penultimate Draft Available here. 
Abstract: The claim that we live in a post-truth era has led to a significant body of work across different disciplines exploring the phenomenon. Many have sought to investigate the role of fake news in bringing about the post-truth era. While this work is important, the narrow focus on this issue runs the risk of giving the impression that it is mainly new forms of media that are to blame for the post-truth phenomenon. In this paper, we call attention to the ways in which journalistic practices in traditional forms of media also play an important role in contributing to a post-truth environment. We will do so by focusing on one particular practice common in news journalism. False balance involves presenting two sides of a debate as more equal than is justified by the evidence. We will argue that although false balance does not constitute fake news, it does contribute to an environment in which truth is devalued.  By obscuring what counts as evidence and who qualifies as an authority, false balance legitimizes post-truth attitudes. We finish by outlining the virtues that journalists should develop in order to guard against false balance. While fake news is made more likely when journalists possess the vices of dishonesty, prejudice or corruption, we argue that focusing too much on guarding against these vices may actually make false balance more likely. In order to be responsible gatekeepers and to avoid false balance, journalists must also develop the virtues of wisdom, vigilance, courage, care and justice.

2021. Nudging Charitable Giving: What (if anything) is wrong with it? (With Rebecca C. Ruehle and Bart Engelen) Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly Vol.50 (2): 353-371. (Open Access) ​
Abstract: Nudging techniques can help charities to increase donations. In this article, we first provide a systematic overview of prototypical nudges that promote charitable giving. Second, we argue that plenty of the ethical objections raised against nudges, such as the exploitation of power they involve and the arguably intrusive and deceptive nature, are not specific to nudging itself. Carefully designing nudges can help to avoid these worries. Third, given that most concerns boil down to the worry that nudges infringe on people’s autonomy, we analyze when this could nevertheless be justified. We differentiate between perfect duties, imperfect duties, and supererogatory acts and argue that nudges are (a) morally permissible (even when they violate autonomy) when it comes to perfect duties and can (b) provide the best available strategy when it comes to imperfect duties. That said, we also analyze the conditions under which nudging charitable giving is impermissible.

2020. Admiration over time. (With Ben Matheson) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol.101 (4) pp. 669-689. 
Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the diachronic fittingness conditions of admiration – that is, what it takes for a person to continue or cease to be admirable over time. We present a series of cases that elicit judgements that suggest different understandings of admiration over time. In some cases, admirability seems to last forever. In other cases, it seems that it can cease within a person's lifetime if she changes sufficiently. Taken together, these cases highlight what we call the puzzle of admiration over time. We then present a potential solution to this puzzle.

2020. Epistemic Injustice and the Attention Economy (With Leonie Smith) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Vol.23: 777-795 (Open Access) 
Abstract: In recent years, a significant body of literature has emerged on the subject of epistemic injustice: wrongful harms done to people in their capacities as knowers (Fricker 2007). Up to now this literature has ignored the role that attention has to play in epistemic injustice. This paper makes a first step towards addressing this gap. We argue that giving someone less attention than they are due, which we call an epistemic attention deficit, is a distinct form of epistemic injustice. We begin by outlining what we mean by epistemic attention deficits, which we understand as a failure to pay someone the attention they are due in their role as an epistemic agent. We argue that these deficits constitute epistemic injustices for two reasons. First, they affect someone’s ability to influence what others believe. Second, they affect one’s ability to influence the shared common ground in which testimonial exchanges take place. We then outline the various ways in which epistemic attention deficits harm those who are subject to them. We argue that epistemic attention deficits are harms in and of themselves because they deprive people of an essential component of epistemic agency. Moreover, epistemic attention deficits reduce an agent’s ability to participate in valuable epistemic practices. These two forms of harm have important impacts on educational performance and the distribution of resources. Finally, we argue that epistemic attention deficits both hinder and shape the development of epistemic agency. We finish by exploring some practical implications arising from our discussion
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2020. Ambassadors of the Game: Do Famous Athletes Have Special Obligations to Act Virtuously? Journal of the Philosophy of Sport Vol.47 (2): 301-317  (With Christopher Yorke)
Abstract: Do famous athletes have special obligations to act virtuously? A number of philosophers have investigated this question by examining whether famous athletes are subject to special role model obligations (Wellman 2003; Feezel 2005; Spurgin 2012). In this paper we will take a different approach and give a positive response to this question by arguing for the position that sport and gaming celebrities are ‘ambassadors of the game’: moral agents whose vocations as rule-followers have unique implications for their non-lusory lives. According to this idea, the actions of a game’s players and other stakeholders—especially the actions of its stars—directly affect the value of the game itself, a fact which generates additional moral reasons to behave in a virtuous manner. We will begin by explaining the three main positions one may take with respect to the question: moral exceptionalism, moral generalism, and moral exemplarism. We will argue that no convincing case for moral exemplarism has thus far been made, which gives us reason to look for new ways to defend this position. We then provide our own ‘ambassadors of the game’ account and argue that it gives us good reason to think that sport and game celebrities are subject to special obligations to act virtuously.

2020 Celebrity, Democracy, and Epistemic Power (With Amanda Cawston, Ben Matheson and Machteld Geuskens) Perspectives on Politics (Open Access) ​Volume 18 (1) pp.27-42. 
​Abstract: : What, if anything, is problematic about the involvement of celebrities in democratic politics? While a number of theorists have criticized celebrity involvement in politics (Meyer 2002; Mills 1957; Postman 1987) none so far have examined this issue using the tools of social epistemology, the study of the effects of social interactions, practices and institutions on knowledge and belief acquisition. This paper will draw on these resources to investigate the issue of celebrity involvement in politics, specifically as this involvement relates to democratic theory and its implications for democratic practice. We will argue that an important and underexplored form of power, which we will call epistemic power, can explain one important way in which celebrity involvement in politics is problematic. This is because unchecked uses and unwarranted allocations of epistemic power, which celebrities tend to enjoy, threaten the legitimacy of existing democracies and raise important questions regarding core commitments of deliberative, epistemic, and plebiscitary models of democratic theory. We will finish by suggesting directions that democratic theorists could pursue when attempting to address some of these problems.  

2020 Lost Without You: The Value of Falling Out of Love (With Pilar Lopez-Cantero) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23(3-4) pp.515-529.  (Open Access) 
Abstract: In this paper we develop a view about the disorientation attached to the process of falling out of love and explain its prudential and moral value. We start with a brief background on theories of love and situate our argument within the views concerned with the lovers’ identities. Namely, love changes who we are. In the context of our paper, we explain this common tenet in the philosophy of love as a change in the lovers’ self-concepts through a process of mutual shaping. This, however, is potentially dangerous for people involved in what we call ‘subsuming relationships’, who give up too much autonomy in the process of mutual shaping. We then move on to show how, through the relation between love and the self-concept, we can explain why the process of falling out of love with someone is so disorientating: when one is falling out of love, one loses an important point of reference for self-understanding. While this disorientating process is typically taken to be harmful to the person experiencing it, we will explain how it can also have moral and prudential value. By re-evaluating who we were in the relationship and who we are now, we can escape from oppressive practices in subsuming relationships. We finish by arguing that this gives us reason to be wary of seeking to re-orient ourselves -or others- too quickly after falling out of love.

2019 Equal Pay for Equal Play: Moral Grounds for Equal Pay in Football  (With Martine Prange) Journal of the Philosophy of Sport (Open Access)  
Abstract: In this paper, we investigate three different ways of defending the claim that national football associations ought to pay their men’s and women’s football teams the same amount. First, we consider an argument that appeals to the principle of equal pay for equal work. We argue that this ‘labor rights’ argument provides a good reason for some national football associations to pay their men’s and women’s teams the same amount but that these are the exception rather than the rule. Next, we consider an alternative argument, which appeals to the ‘expressive power’ of paying women’s football teams the same as men’s. We argue that this argument can be applied more generally than the first argument and gives a good reason for many football associations to pay their men’s and women’s teams equally. However, this argument struggles to show that associations have a moral obligation to pay their men’s and women’s teams the same. We finish by considering the ‘argument from historical injustice’. We argue that this argument provides plausible grounds for thinking that many associations not only have moral reasons to pay their men’s and women’s teams equally, but that they also have a moral obligation and a political responsibility to do so.

​2019. Anger, Affective Injustice, and Emotion Regulation (With Georgina Mills) Philosophical Topics Volume 47 (2) pp.75-94. 
Abstract: Victims of oppression are often called to let go of their anger in order to facilitate better discussion to bring about the end of their oppression. According to Amia Srinivasan (2018), this constitutes an affective injustice. In this paper, we use research on emotion regulation to shed light on the nature of affective injustice. By drawing on the literature on emotion regulation, we illustrate specifically what kind of work is put upon people who are experiencing affective injustice and why it is damaging. We begin by explaining affective injustice and how it can amount to a call for emotion regulation. Then we explain the various techniques that can be used to regulate emotions and explain how each might be harmful here. In the penultimate section of the paper, we explain how the upshot of this is that victims of affective injustice are left with a dilemma. Either they try to regulate their anger in a way that involves ignoring the fact of their oppression or they regulate it in a way that is likely to be harmful for them. Finally, we consider whether there are any good solutions to this dilemma, and how this issue opens up the possibility for further research into emotion regulation and moral philosophy.

2019 When Artists Fall: On Honoring and Admiring the Immoral (With Ben Matheson) Journal of the American Philosophical Association Vol.5 No.2 pp.246-265. (Open Access) 
Abstract: Is it appropriate to honour artists who have created great works but who have also acted immorally? In this paper, after arguing that honouring involves picking out a person as someone we ought to admire, we present three moral reasons against honouring immoral artists. First, we argue that honouring can serve to condone their behaviour, through the mediums of emotional prioritization and exemplar identification. Second, we argue that honouring immoral artists can generate undue epistemic credibility for the artists, which can lead to an indirect form of testimonial injustice for the artists’ victims. Third, we argue, building on the first two reasons, that honouring immoral artists can also serve to silence their victims. We end by considering how we might respond to these reasons.


2019  Admiration and Education: What Should We Do with Immoral Intellectuals? (with Ben Matheson) Ethical Perspectives Vol.26 No.1 pp.5-32
Abstract: How should academics respond to the work of immoral intellectuals? This question appears to be one that is of increasing concern in academic circles but has received little attention in the academic literature. In this paper, we will investigate what our response to immoral intellectuals should be. We begin by outlining the cases of three intellectuals who have behaved immorally or at least have been accused of doing so. We then investigate whether it is appropriate to admire an immoral person for their intellectual contributions. We will argue that such admiration can be a fitting response to the intellectual achievements of an immoral person but only if the person has indeed done something important. However, we then identify two moral reasons against openly admiring immoral intellectuals. First, that such admiration may give the appearance of condoning the immoral acts of the intellectual. Second, that such admiration may lead to emulation of the intellectual’s problematic ideals. This may be enough to persuade us of the moral reasons to avoid engaging with the work of unimportant and easily replaceable intellectuals in our research and our teaching. However, for more important intellectual figures we have weighty educational reasons to cite them and include them in our courses. This leads to a tension, which we attempt to resolve by proposing ways to accommodate the moral reasons against admiring immoral intellectuals and the intellectual reasons to include them in our courses, though we conclude on the pessimistic note that this tension may not be entirely resolvable. 


2019 More important and surprising actions of a moral exemplar trigger stronger admiration and inspiration (With Niels van de Ven and Bart Engelen) Journal of Social Psychology Vol.159 No.4 pp.383-397. (Open Access) 
Abstract: Admiring a moral role model has been found to inspire people to become better persons themselves. But what are the antecedents that trigger admiration and thus make inspiration more likely? In three studies, we tested the effect of perceived importance and perceived surprisingness of the moral action on resulting admiration and inspiration. Study 1 finds that perceived importance, and to a lesser extent, the perceived surprisingness of a moral action, are related to stronger admiration. Manipulating the perceived importance of the same moral action by only providing a little more detail about the moral action, could increase the admiration and inspiration the role models elicit (Studies 2 and 3). Our findings help the understanding of how moral exemplars trigger inspiration and provide valuable insights into further investigation toward the causes of admiration.


2019 Shame and the Sports Fan (With Ben Matheson) Journal of Philosophy of Sport Vol. 46 No.2 pp.208-223. (Open Access) 
Abstract: Sports fans sometimes feel shame for their team’s moral transgressions. In this paper, we investigate this phenomenon. We offer an account of sports fan shame in terms of collective shame. We argue that this account is superior to accounts of sports fan shame in terms of shame for others and shame for oneself. We then argue that accepting the role that sports stars play in bringing about the collective shame amongst their fans provides a new way of justifying the claim that sport stars are subject to special moral obligations. 
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2019 Lord Jim: How Moral Exemplars Can Ruin Your Life (With Alan Thomas and Bart Engelen) In Alfred Archer and Andre Grahle (Eds.) The Moral Psychology of Admiration Lanham MA: Rowman and Littlefield). 
Abstract: What role should admiration for moral exemplars play in the moral development of those with more ordinary levels of moral virtue? Linda Zagzebski (2017) has argued that exemplars should serve as models for emulation. We agree that exemplars have an important role to play in moral education (See Engelen et al Forthcoming). However, our aim in this paper will be to sound a warning about the ways in which attempting to emulate exemplars can go badly wrong. While in some circumstances, attempting to imitate a moral exemplar can improve one’s behavior, in other circumstances it can constitute a distinctive form of moral error. We will illustrate this with the example of the eponymous hero of Joseph Conrad’s novel Lord Jim, whose attempts to emulate his heroes lead to disaster. The case of Jim reveals how emulating heroes can ruin a person’s life. Imagining oneself in the exemplary role of a hero may undermine one’s ability to respond appropriately to ethical challenges. It leads Jim not only to ruin his life, but also to embrace his unnecessary death

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2019 Playing with Art in Suits' Utopia (With Nathan Wildman) Sport, Ethics and Philosophy Vol.13 No.3-4 pp.456-470. (Open Access) 
Abstract: According to Bernard Suits, people in utopia would spend their time playing games and would not spend any time creating or engaging with artworks. Here, we argue against this claim. We do so by arguing that some games essentially involve aesthetic engagement with artworks. One type of game that seems to do so is dual-natured games, works that are both games and artworks. If utopians were to play such games, then they would be engaging with artworks. However, Rough (2017a) has recently called into question the possibility of dual-natured games. With that in mind, we also offer a second kind of game that serves as a counter-example to Suits: art-inclusive games, which involve aesthetic and artistic engagement as part of their playing. After providing some examples of this kind of game, we show that the possibility of such games presents a problem for Suits’ claim that utopians would not engage with artworks. If utopians were to play them, then they would be engaging with artworks. And as there is no good reason to think that utopians would not play such games, we conclude that Suits’ claim about the lack of engagement with art in utopia should be rejected. 


2019 Admiration and Motivation Emotion Review Vol. 11 No. 2 pp.140-150 (Open Access) 
Abstract: What is the motivational profile of admiration? In this paper I will investigate what form of connection between admiration and motivation there may be good reason to accept.  A number of philosophers have advocated a connection between admiration and motivation to emulate. I will start by examining this view. I will present three problems for this view. Before suggesting an expanded account of the connection between admiration and motivation according to which admiration involves motivation to promote the value that is judged to be present in the object of admiration. Finally I will examine the implications of this account for the use of admiration in education. 


2019 Effective Vote Markets and the Tyranny of Wealth (With Bart Engelen and Viktor Ivanković) Res Publica Vol. 25 No. 1 pp.39-54 (Open Access)
Abstract: What limits should there be on the areas of life that are governed by market forces? For many years, no one seriously defended the buying and selling votes for political elections. In recent years, however, this situation has changed, with a number of authors defending the permissibility of vote markets (e.g. Freiman 2014). One popular objection to such markets is that they would lead to a tyranny of wealth, where the poor are politically dominated by the rich. In a recent paper, James Stacey Taylor (forthcoming a) has argued that this objection can be avoided if certain restrictions are placed on vote markets. In this paper we will argue that this attempt to rebut an argument against vote markets is unsuccessful. Either vote markets secure their purported benefits but then they inevitably lead to a tyranny of wealth, or they are restricted so heavily that they lack the features that have been claimed to make vote markets attractive in the first place. Using Taylor’s proposal as a test case, we make the more general claim that vote markets cannot avoid the tyranny of wealth objection and bring about their supposed benefits at the same time.


2018 Are We Obliged to Enhance for Moral Perfection? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Vol.43 No.5 pp.490-505
Abstract: Suppose we could take a pill that would turn us into morally perfect people. Would we have a duty to take such a pill? In recent years a number of philosophers have investigated this issue. Most prominently, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2012) have argued that we would have a duty to take such a pill. In this paper I wish to investigate the possible limits of a duty to take moral enhancement drugs through investigating the related question of whether it would be desirable to create a world populated entirely with morally perfect people. I will argue, drawing on the work of Bernard Williams (1981), Susan Wolf (1982) and Michael Slote (1983) that we have reason to be grateful that we do not live a world in which everyone is morally perfect, as this would prevent people from dedicating their lives to valuable non-moral projects. I will then argue that this thought should serve as a limitation on attempts to morally improve people through the use of technology. Finally, I will explore the implications of this discussion for some of the less ambitious forms of moral enhancement currently being explored in the literature. I will argue that these forms of enhancement give us no reason to worry about preventing valuable non-moral ways of life. In fact, by acting as a shortcut to moral development, they might serve as an aid to help people fulfill valuable non-moral goals in a way that is morally permissible.


2018 Beyond the Call of Beauty: Everyday Aesthetic Demands Under Patriarchy (With Lauren Ware) The Monist Vol. 101 No.1 pp.114-127. Penultimate  draft available here. 
Abstract: A recognisable feature of our lives is that we make aesthetic demands of each other: we demand that people meet certain aesthetic standards and hold them accountable when they do not. These aesthetic demands are particularly prevalent in the realm of everyday aesthetics. We demand that people dress according to certain standards for certain jobs or social occasions. We demand that those we live with keep our homes in line with certain aesthetic standards (though as many couples and flatmates will recognise, these standards vary greatly). We demand that people refrain from playing certain music on certain occasions—like polka at a funeral. It is surprising then, that up to now the literature on aesthetic requirements has had little to say about the realm of everyday aesthetics. This paper will defend two claims. First, we will argue for the existence of aesthetic demands in the realm of everyday aesthetics and that these demands are not reducible to moral demands. Second, we will argue that we must recognise the limits of these demands in order to combat a prevalent and important form of gendered oppression. A defence of aesthetic supererogation offers a new structural framework to this debate.
Featured in Oxford University Press’ Best Philosophy of 2018 List https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/best_of_philosophy?fbclid=IwAR2IMhXcX4qHLevg6ntgx5WUeRpoOgqC-9IyH9oJTUipT531nbGH4MsBRZs


2018 The Problem with Moralism Ratio  Vol.31 No.3 pp.342-350. (Open Access)
Abstract: Moralism is often described as a vice. But what exactly is wrong with moralism that makes it aptly described as a character flaw? This paper will argue that the problem with moralism is that it downgrades the force of legitimate moral criticism. The first section will argue that moralism involves an inflated sense of the extent to which moral criticism is appropriate. The second section will examine the value of legitimate moral criticism, arguing that its value stems from enabling us to take a stand against immoral behavior. The third section will argue that unwarranted moral criticism downgrades the force of legitimate moral criticism and that this is why moralism should be seen as a vice. 


2018 Rehabilitating Self-Sacrifice: Care Ethics and the Politics of Resistance (With Amanda Cawston) International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol.26 No.3 pp.456-477. (Open Access)
Abstract: How should feminists view acts of self-sacrifice performed by women? According to a long-standing critique of care ethics such acts ought to be viewed with scepticism. Care ethics, it is claimed, celebrates acts of self-sacrifice on the part of carers and in doing so encourages women to choose caring for others over their own self-development. In doing so, care ethics frustrates attempts to liberate women from the oppression of patriarchy. Care ethicists have responded to this critique by noting limits on the level, form, or scope of self-sacrifice that work to restrict its role in their theories. While we do not here take issue with the initial feminist critiques of self-sacrifice, we suspect that the strategies offered by Care ethicists in response are importantly flawed. Specifically, these responses undervalue the positive roles that self-sacrifice can play in fighting patriarchal oppression. As a result, in attempting to restrict an oppressive norm, these responses risk foreclosing on valuable means of resistance. Our aim is to explore these positive roles for self-sacrifice and thereby rehabilitate its standing with feminists.


2018 Supererogation Philosophy Compass Vol.13 No. 3 Penultimate draft available here. 
Abstract: It is a recognisable feature of commonsense morality that some actions are beyond the call of duty or supererogatory. Acts of supererogation raise a number of interesting philosophical questions and debates. This article will provide an overview of three of these debates. First, I will provide an overview of the debate about whether or not acts of supererogation exist. Next, I will investigate the issue of how to define the supererogatory. I will finish by examining a problem known as the Paradox of Supererogation. 

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2018 Exemplars and Nudges: Combining Two Strategies for Moral Education (Co-Authored with Bart Engelen, Alan Thomas and Niels van de Ven) Journal of Moral Education (Open Access) Vol. 47 No.3 pp.346-365.
Abstract: This paper defends the use of narratives about morally exemplary individuals in moral education and appraises the role that ‘nudge’ strategies can play in combination with such an appeal to exemplars. It presents a general conception of the aims of moral education and explains how the proposed combination of both moral strategies serves these aims. An important aim of moral education is to make the ethical perspective of the subject – the person being educated – more structured, more salient and therefore more ‘navigable’. This paper argues why and how moral exemplars and nudge strategies are crucial aids in this respect. It gives an empirically grounded account of how the emotion of admiration can be triggered most effectively by a thoughtful presentation of narratives about moral exemplars. It also answers possible objections and concludes that a combined appeal to exemplars and nudges provides a neglected but valuable resource for moral education. 

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2018 The Moral Value of Compassion in Justin Caouette and Carolyn Price (Eds.) The Moral Psychology of                                      Compassion (Rowman and Littlefield) Penultimate draft available here. 
Abstract: Many people think that compassion has an important role to play in our moral lives. We might even think, as Arthur Schopenhauer (2010 [1840]) did, that compassion is the basis of morality. More modestly, we might think that compassion is one important source of moral motivation and would play an important role in the life of a virtuous person. Recently, however philosophers such as Roger Crisp (2008), and Jesse Prinz (2011) and psychologists such as Paul Bloom (2016) have called into question the value of sharing in another’s suffering. All three argue that this should not play a significant role in the life of the morally virtuous person. In its place, Crisp endorses rational benevolence as the central form of moral motivation for virtuous people. I will argue that despite the problems facing compassion, it has a distinctive role to play in moral life that cannot be fully captured by rational benevolence. My discussion will proceed as follows. In §1, I examine the nature of compassion and explain how I will be using the term in this paper. I will then, in §2, explain the traditional account of the value of compassion as a source of moral motivation. In §3, I will investigate a number of challenges to the value of compassionate moral motivation. I will then, in §4, explain why, despite facing important problems, compassion has a distinctive role to play in moral life.

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2017 In Defence of Biodiversity (With Joanna Burch-Brown) Biology and Philosophy Vol. 32 no. 6 pp. 969-997 ​(Open Access) 
Abstract: Biodiversity has played a central role within conservation biology over the last thirty years. How the concept should be understood, however, is a matter of ongoing debate. In this paper, we defend what we call a classic multidimensional conception of biodiversity. We begin by introducing two arguments against the importance of biodiversity, both of which have been put forward in a recent paper by Carlos Santana (2014).  The first argument is against the scientific usefulness of the concept of biodiversity; and the other is against its value as a target of conservation.  Neither of these objections is successful against the classic multidimensional conception of biodiversity. As we show, the umbrella concept of biological diversity is important from a scientific perspective, because it plays important explanatory roles within contemporary ecology. Moreover we argue that although biodiversity as we understand it does not capture all valuable features of the natural world, this does not show that we should abandon it as a target of conservation. Instead, it might show that biodiversity should be conceived as just one of many grounds of value associated with ecosystems. This is consistent with concluding that protecting biodiversity should remain a central target of conservation efforts.


2017 Sporting Supererogation and Why it Matters Journal of the Philosophy of Sport Vol.44 No.3 pp.359-373 Penultimate draft available here. 
Abstract: A commonly accepted feature of commonsense morality is that there are some acts that are supererogatory or beyond the call of duty. Recently, philosophers have begun to ask whether something like supererogation might exist in other normative domains such as epistemology and aesthetics. In this paper I will argue that there is good reason to think that sporting supererogation exists. I will then argue that recognizing the existence of sporting supererogation is important because it highlights the value of sport as a mutual pursuit of excellence and reinforces the value of sportsmanship. 


2017 Aesthetic Judgements and Motivation Inquiry Vol.60 No.6 pp.656-674  Penultimate draft available here. 
Abstract: There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from Non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical Non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism. It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, pushes us towards accepting Non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those wishing to defend Aesthetic Non-cognitivism, would be to appeal to a similar argument. However, both Caj Strandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstong have argued that Internalism is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements by raising objections against Aesthetic Internalism. In this paper I will argue that both of these objections can be raised against Internalism about moral judgements as well. As a result, Internalism is no less plausible a claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I will then show how a theory of Internalism about normative judgements in general is capable of avoiding both of these objections. 


2017 Integrity and the Value of an Integrated Self Journal of Value Inquiry Vol.51 No.3 pp.435-454 (Open Access)
Abstract: What is integrity and why is it valuable? One account of the nature of integrity, proposed by John Cottingham (2010) amongst others, is The Integrated Self View. On this account integrity is a formal relation of coherence between various aspects of a person. One problem that has been raised against this account is that it isn’t obvious that it can account for the value of integrity. In this paper I will respond to this problem by providing an account of the value of an integrated self. I will do so by first looking closely at two examples from literature: John Sassal in John Berger’s A Fortunate Man and Tetrius Lydgate in George Eliot’s Middlemarch. Based on my comparison of these two case studies I will argue that an integrated self is valuable as it makes people more likely to act in line with their moral judgements.  ​​


2017 Forgiveness and the Limits of Duty Etica & Politica / Ethics and Politics Vol. 19 No.1 pp.225-244 (Open Access).
Abstract: Can there be a duty to forgive those who have wronged us? According to a popular view amongst philosophers working on forgiveness the answer is no. Forgiveness, it is claimed, is always elective. This view is rejected by Gamlund (2010a; 2010b) who argues that duties to forgive do exist and then provides conditions that are relevant to determining whether forgiveness is obligatory or supererogatory. In this paper I will argue that the conditions that Gamlund provides do not provide a plausible account of the connection between forgiveness and duty. The problems I will raise against Gamlund’s view is a problem that faces any moral view that makes room for supererogation. I will then investigate whether the existing solutions to this problem provide a more plausible account of the connection between forgiveness and obligation. I will argue that the two most prominent solutions, The Favouring Reasons View and The Sacrifice View, produce implausible results when applied to the case of forgiveness. However, an alternative view, The Freedom View, can provide plausible results when applied to the case of forgiveness. This gives us defeasible reason to favour this as a general solution to The Problem of the Good Ought Tie-Up.
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2017  Aesthetic Supererogation (With Lauren Ware) Estetika Vol. 54 pp. 102-116. Penultimate draft available here. 
Abstract:​ Many aestheticians and ethicists are interested in the similarities and connections between aesthetics and ethics (Nussbaum 1990; Foot 2002; Gaut 2007). One way in which some have suggested the two domains are different is that in ethics there exist obligations while in aesthetics there do not (Hampshire 1954). However, Marcia Muelder Eaton has argued that there is good reason to think that aesthetic obligations do exist (Eaton 2008). We will explore the nature of these obligations by asking whether acts of aesthetic supererogation (acts that go beyond the call of our aesthetic obligations) are possible. In this paper, we defend the thesis that there is good reason to think such acts exist.
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2016 De Dicto Moral Desires and the Moral Sentiments: Adam Smith on The Role of De Dicto Moral Desires in the Virtuous        Agent History of Philosophy Quarterly Vol. 33 No. 4 pp. 327-345.
Abstract: What role should a motivation to do the right thing, read de dicto, play in the life of a virtuous agent? According to a prominent argument from Michael Smith, those who are only motivated by such a desire are moral fetishists. Since Smith’s argument, a number of philosophers have examined what role this desire would play in the life of the morally virtuous agent. My primary aim in this paper is an historical one. I will show that much of this discussion can be found in Adam Smith’s The Theory of the Moral Sentiments (1764), published over two hundred years before Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem. I will then argue that there is an important insight to be found in Adam Smith’s book that is missing from the contemporary discussion. According to Adam Smith, while a de dicto desire to do the right thing can play an important role in the life of a virtuous agent, the person who is only ever motivated by this desire will often be epistemically disadvantaged compared to the person who possesses the appropriate sentiments. I will argue that Adam Smith’s claim is plausible given his own view of the moral sentiments as providing the foundation of morality. In addition, there is good reason to accept Smith’s claim even for those who do not accept his view of the foundational role of the moral sentiments.
 

2016 Moral Obligation, Self-Interest and the Transitivity Problem Utilitas Vol 28 No. 4 pp.441-464 Penultimate draft available here. 
Abstract: Is the relation ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ transitive? The answer seems to be a straightforward yes. If Act B is a morally permissible alternative to Act A and Act C is a morally permissible alternative to B then how could C fail to be a morally permissible alternative to A? However, as both Dale Dorsey and Frances Kamm point out, there are cases where this transitivity appears problematic. My aim in this paper is to provide a solution to this problem. I will then investigate Kamm’s justification for rejecting the transitivity of the ‘is a permissible alternative to’ relation. Next, I will look at Dorsey’s solution, which involves a reinterpretation of the intuitions used to generate the problem. I will argue that neither of these solutions are fully satisfying before going on to provide my own solution to the problem and arguing that it avoids these problems.
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2016 Supererogation, Sacrifice and the Limits of Duty Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 54 No. 3 pp.333-354 Penultimate draft available here. 
Abstract: It is often claimed that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. This claim is made because it is thought that it is the level of sacrifice involved that prevents these acts from being morally required. In this paper, I will argue against this claim. I will start by making a distinction between two ways of understanding the claim that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. I will then examine some purported counter-examples to the view that supererogation always involves sacrifice and examine their limitation. Next, I will examine how this view might be defended, building on comments by Dale Dorsey and Henry Sidgwick. I will then argue that the view and the argument in favour of it should be rejected. I will finish by showing how an alternative explanation for the limits of moral obligation avoids the problems facing The Sacrifice View.
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2016 Moral Enhancement and Those Left Behind Bioethics Vol. 30 No. 7 pp.500-510. Penultimate draft available here. 
​Abstract: Opponents to genetic or biomedical human enhancement often claim that the availability of these technologies would have negative consequences for those who either choose not to utilize these resources or lack access to them. However, Thomas Douglas has argued that this objection has no force against the use of technologies that aim to bring about morally desirable character traits, as the unenhanced would benefit from being surrounded by such people. I will argue that things are not as straightforward as Douglas makes out. The widespread use of moral enhancement would raise the standards for praise and blame worthiness, making it much harder for the unenhanced to perform praiseworthy actions or avoid performing blameworthy actions. This shows that supporters of moral enhancement cannot avoid this challenge in the way that Douglas suggests.


2016 Motivational Judgement Internalism and the Problem of Supererogation Journal of Philosophical Research  Vol. 41          pp. 601-621. Penultimate draft available here
Abstract: Motivational judgment internalists hold that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. There is, though, an important lack of clarity in the literature about the types of moral evaluation the theory is supposed to cover. It is rarely made clear whether the theory is intended to cover all moral judgements or whether the claim covers only a subset of such judgements. In this paper I will investigate which moral judgements internalists should hold their theory to apply to. I will argue that the possibility of the supererogation amoralist, someone who makes genuine supererogation judgements but remains unmotivated by them, makes it implausible to be an internalist about moral goodness. As a result, internalists should restrict their claim to moral requirement judgements. I will then argue that this creates an explanatory burden for Internalism. In order for their view to be plausible they must explain why some moral judgements and not others are necessarily connected to motivation.


2016 Are Acts of Supererogation Always Praiseworthy? Theoria Vol. 82 No. 3 pp. 238-255 Penultimate draft available here. 
Abstract: It is commonly assumed that praiseworthiness should form part of the analysis of supererogation. I will argue that this view should be rejected. I will start by arguing that, at least on some views of the connection between moral value and praiseworthiness, it does not follow from the fact that acts of supererogation go beyond what is required by duty that they will always be praiseworthy to perform. I will then consider and dismiss what I will call ‘The Argument From Stipulation’ in favour of holding that acts of supererogation are always praiseworthy. Next, I will examine what I will call ‘The Necessary Connection Argument’, which posits a necessary connection between supererogation and praiseworthiness. I will argue that the intuitions used to motivate this argument are best explained by a debunking explanation. 


2016 The Supererogatory and How Not To Accommodate It Utilitas Vol. 28 No. 2 pp. 179-188 Penultimate draft available here.
Abstract: It is plausible to think that there exist acts of supererogation (acts that are morally optional and morally better than the minimum that morality demands). It also seems plausible that there is a close connection between what we are morally required to do and what it would be morally good to do. Despite being independently plausible these two claims are hard to reconcile. My aim in this paper will be to respond to a recent solution to this puzzle proposed by Dale Dorsey (2013). Dorsey’s solution to this problem is to posit a new account of supererogation. I will argue that Dorsey’s account fails to succeed in achieving what an account of supererogation is supposed to achieve.


2016 Evil and Moral Detachment: Further Reflections on The Mirror Thesis International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol  24 No.2 pp.201-218. Penultimate draft available here.  
Abstract: ​A commonly accepted claim by philosophers investigating the nature of evil is that the evil person is, in some way, the mirror image of the moral saint. In this paper I will defend a new version of this thesis. I will argue that both the moral saint and the morally evil person are characterised by a lack of conflict between moral and non-moral concerns. However, while the saint achieves this unity through a reconciliation of the two, the evil person does so by eliminating moral concerns from her character. 


2016 On Sporting Integrity Sport, Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 10 No. 2 pp.117-131. Penultimate draft available here.
Abstract: It has become increasingly popular for sports fans, pundits, coaches and players to appeal to ideas of ‘sporting integrity’ when voicing their approval or disapproval of some aspect of the sporting world. My goal in this paper will be to examine whether there is any way to understand this idea in a way that both makes sense of the way in which it is used and presents a distinctly ‘sporting’ form of integrity. I will look at three recent high profile sporting incidents that caused sporting integrity to be called into question. I will then examine three different ways in which philosophers have sought to understand integrity and examine whether any of these accounts can provide us with a plausible account of sporting integrity. I will argue that such an account can be given and show how this helps us to understand the three cases.  


2016 Divine Moral Goodness, Supererogation and The Euthyphro Dilemma International Journal for Philosophy of                    Religion Vol. 79 No. 2 pp. 147-160. Penultimate draft available here.
Abstract: How can we make sense of God’s moral goodness if God cannot be subject to moral obligations? This question is troubling for Divine Command Theorists, as if we cannot make sense of God’s moral goodness then it seems hard to see how God’s commands could be morally good. William P. Alston (1989) argues that the concept of supererogation solves this problem. If we accept the existence of acts that are morally good but not morally required then we should accept that there is no need for an act to fulfill a moral obligation in order for it to be morally good (1989 p.261). This view has been criticized by both Eleonore Stump (1992) and Josef Lombardi (2005), who
claim that it is impossible for an agent who has no obligations to perform acts of supererogation. Elizabeth Drummond Young (2013) attempts to defend Alston’s solution by offering a new analysis of supererogation. In this paper I will argue first
that Young fails to provide an adequate response to Lombardi’s objection. I will then provide my own defence of Alston’s proposal.


2016 Community, Pluralism and Individualistic Pursuits: A Defence of Why Not Socialism? Social Theory and Practice. Vol.    42 Issue 1 pp. 57-73. Penultimate draft available here
Abstract: Is socialism morally preferable to free market capitalism? G. A. Cohen (2009) has argued that even when the economic inequalities produced by free markets are not the result of injustice, they nevertheless ought to be avoided because they are community undermining. As free markets inevitably lead to economic inequalities and Socialism does not, Socialism is morally preferable. This argument has been the subject of recent criticism. Chad Van Schoelandt (2014) argues that it depends on a conception of community that is incompatible with pluralism while Richard Miller (2010) argues that it rules out individualistic pursuits. I will show that both of these objections rest upon a misreading of Cohen’s argument.


2016 Do We Need to Make Room For Quasi-Supererogation  Journal of Value Inquiry Vol 50 No. 2 pp.341-351.  (Open Access)
Abstract: It is commonly held that in addition to the deontic categories of The Forbidden, The Indifferent and The Obligatory we must also make room for The Supererogatory. Some philosophers argue that we must go further and make room for an additional category of Offence or Suberogation. Gregory Mellema has argued that even this does not go far enough and we must also make room for the categories of Quasi-Supererogation and Quasi-Offence. According to Mellema, in the absence of these categories we will be unable to accommodate the possibility of optional acts that are praiseworthy to perform and blameworthy to omit. In this paper I will argue that Mellema’s defence of this claim is unsuccessful. What his arguments instead show is that it can sometimes be blameworthy to omit an act of supererogation and praiseworthy to omit an offence.


2015 Saints, Heroes and Moral Necessity Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplementary Volume. Penultimate draft                        Available here. 
Many people who perform paradigmatic examples of acts of supererogation claim that they could not have done otherwise. In this paper I will argue that these self-reports from moral exemplars present a challenge to the traditional view of supererogation as involving agential sacrifice. I will argue that the claims made by moral exemplars are plausibly understood as what Bernard Williams calls a ‘practical necessity’. I will then argue that this makes it implausible to view these acts as involving agential sacrifice.


2015 The Heroism Paradox: Another Paradox of Supererogation (Co-Authored with Mike Ridge) Philosophical Studies
Abstract: Philosophers are by now familiar with “the” paradox of supererogation. This paradox arises out of the idea that it can never be permissible to do something morally inferior to another available option, yet acts of supererogation seem to presuppose this. This paradox is not our topic in this paper. We mention it only to set it to one side and explain our subtitle. In this paper we introduce and explore another paradox of supererogation, one which also deserves serious philosophical attention. People who perform paradigmatic acts of supererogation very often claim and believe that their acts were obligatory. Plausibly, this is simply a mistake insofar as the actions really are “above and beyond the call of duty,” as common sense would have it. The fact that moral heroes tend to view their actions in this apparently mistaken way is puzzling in itself, and we might learn something interesting about the moral psychology of such individuals if we could explain this tendency. However, this puzzling aspect of the moral psychology of moral heroes is also the chief ingredient in a deeper puzzle, one perhaps more worthy of the title “paradox.” In this paper we present and try to resolve this paradox. The paradox arises when we combine our initial observation about the moral psychology of moral heroes with three plausible claims about how these cases compare with one in which the agent realizes her act is “above and beyond.” The first of these three additional claims is that the agent who mistakenly claims that the act is obligatory is no less virtuous than someone who performs such an act whilst correctly judging it to be obligatory. The second is that the agent who makes such a mistake would display more moral wisdom if she judged the act to be supererogatory. The third is that there is no other relevant difference between the two agents. These three claims, together with a plausible principle about the way in which the virtues work, give rise to a paradox. We consider several ways in which this paradox might be resolved. We argue that the most plausible resolution is to reject the claim that there is no other relevant difference between the two agents. More specifically, we argue that a relevant difference is that the agent who makes this mistake does so because of the depth of their commitment to certain moral values, and that this is itself an important moral virtue: moral depth.


2014 Against Vote Markets (Co-Authored with Alan T. Wilson)  Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (August 2014) (Open    Access)
Abstract:  According to a recent paper by Christopher Freiman (Forthcoming) the prohibition on the buying and selling of votes ought to be lifted. We will argue that Freiman’s defence of that position is unsuccessful. Freiman presents defeasible reasons in favour of the legalization of vote markets (pp. 2-8). He then considers two arguments – the Equality Argument and the Republican Argument – which, if either were correct, would undermine those defeasible reasons. By rejecting these arguments, Freiman takes himself to have shown that the reasons in favour of vote markets remain undefeated, and so the case for vote markets is stronger than has been assumed. We will focus on Freiman’s response to the Equality Argument, showing that this response is flawed and that, therefore, Freiman’s defence of vote markets is not successful.


2014 Forcing Cohen to Abandon Forced Supererogation Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (March 2014). (Open Access)
Abstract:  The possibility of acts of supererogation, those that are beyond the call of duty, creates problems for those committed to a tripartite division of the deontic landscape into the obligatory, the forbidden and the neutral. For some, Gregory Mellema for example, expanding our deontic system to include the supererogatory does not go far enough and we must also make room for acts of ‘quasi-supererogation’. Shlomo Cohen has argued that even this is not enough, as we must also make room for acts of ‘Forced Supererogation’. In this reply I will show that Cohen’s defence of this thesis is unsuccessful. 


2014 Moral Rationalism Without Overridingness Ratio (Vol. 27 No.1 pp.100-114) Penultimate draft available here
Abstract: Moral Rationalism is the view that if an act is morally required then it is what there is most reason to do. It is often assumed that the truth of Moral Rationalism is dependent on some version of The Overridingness Thesis, the view that moral reasons override nonmoral reasons. However, as Douglas Portmore has pointed out, the two can come apart; we can accept Moral Rationalism without accepting any version of The Overridingness Thesis. Nevertheless, The Overridingness Thesis serves as one of two possibleexplanations for Moral Rationalism. In this paper I will investigate which of these two explanations a moral rationalist should accept. I will argue that when we properly attend to the form of Moral Rationalism supported by the intuitions that motivate the view, we are left with no reason to accept The Overridingness Thesis.


2013 Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent Philosophia (Vol. 41 No. 2 pp.447-462). Penultimate draft available here
Abstract: It has been claimed, by David Heyd, that in order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent performing the act must possess altruistic intentions (1982 p.115). This requirement, Heyd claims, allows us to make sense of the meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. In this paper I will investigate whether there is good reason to accept that this requirement is a necessary condition of supererogation. I will argue that such a reason can be found in cases where two people act in the same way but with only the person who acted with altruistic intent counting as having performed an act of supererogation. In such cases Heyd’s intention requirement plays an important role in ruling out acts that intuitively are not supererogatory. Despite this, I will argue that we should reject Heyd’s requirement and replace it with a moral intention requirement. I will then investigate how to formulate this requirement and respond to two objections that might be raised against it.

ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES

2020          Supererogation Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

EDITORIALS

2018           Self-Sacrifice and Moral Philosophy (With Marcel van Ackeren) International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 

BOOK REVIEWS

2018           Review of Macalester Bell Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt In Philosophical Quarterly                                                        Vol.68 Issue 271 pp.395-397.  Penultimate Draft available ​here. 

2018            Review of Linda Zagzebski Exemplarist Moral Theory In Ethics Vol.128 (3) pp.682-686. Penultimate Draft available here.  

2017            Review of M. v. Ackeren and M. Kühler (Eds.) The Limits of Moral Obligation: Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies                              Can In Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6) pp. 761-764. Penultimate Draft available here. 

2016            Review of Steve Bein Compassion and Moral Guidance In Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3), pp. 795-796.
                     
                     Review of Lisa Tessman Moral Failure: On The Impossible Demands of Morality In Philosophical Quarterly 66, pp. 400-402. 

2014            Review of Greg Scherkoske Leading a Convincing Life: Integrity and the Virtues of Reason, In Philosophy 89, pp 495-499. 

                     Review of Sebastian Schleidgen (Ed.) Should We Always Act Morally: Essays On Overridingness, In Ethical Theory And                                Moral Practice Vol. 17 No.2 pp.349-350.

2012            Review of Roger Tiechmann Nature, Reason and the Good Life, In Journal of Value Inquiry Vol. 46 (1) pp. 113-116.

                     Review of Tim Mulgan Ethics for a Broken World, In Philosophy Now

                     Review of Matthew J. Goodwin New British Fascism of the British National Party In Political Studies Review Vol. 10 (3)                              p. 451.